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I. Introduction 
For three decades, Lyman Johnson and David Millon have 
stood for the proposition that corporate law should concern itself 
with social welfare.1 They have done so with commitment, 
analytical skill, and rhetorical facility, seeking to preserve an 
institutional vision in which corporations and the law that creates 
them protect people from the ravages of volatile free markets. They 
first intervened during the late 1980s, a time when corporate legal 
institutions and market forces came to blows over questions 
concerning hostile takeovers.2 At the time it seemed like the 
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 1. See David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, 
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 
1374 (1993) [hereinafter Millon, New Directions] (addressing balance between 
shareholder and non-shareholder constituencies); Lyman P. Q. Johnson, New 
Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1713, 1713–14 (1993) 
(discussing limitations on shareholder primacy). 
 2. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 224 
(1991) [hereinafter Millon, Redefining Corporate Law] (discussing hostile 
takeover crisis). 
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institutions had won, with Johnson and Millon striving to add 
protective depth to the outcome by advocating for inclusion of 
constituent interests as beneficiaries in the corporation’s legal 
model.3 But a different picture has emerged as the years have gone 
by. It is now clear that the market side really won the battle of the 
1980s, succeeding in entering a wedge between corporate law and 
social welfare.4 The distance between the Johnson and Millon’s 
welfarist enterprise and its corporate law target has been widening 
ever since. 
This Essay is a meditation on that widening gulf. It will 
compare the vision of the corporation and of the role it plays in 
society that prevailed during the immediate post-war era, before 
the fulcrum years of the 1980s, with the very different vision we 
have today, and trace the path we took from there to here. It will 
close with a brief prediction regarding corporate law’s future. 
II. The Post-War Corporation 
The post-war writings of Adolf Berle provide a lens that brings 
into focus a lost vision of a welfarist corporation. Berle described 
an “American economic republic,” a sort of latter-day 
constitutional settlement directed to production and employment.5 
Although Berle is remembered for having problematized corporate 
power in a famous book published in 1932, for most of his career 
he stood for the opposite proposition.6 There was no inconsistency, 
for, in Berle’s view, the New Deal had changed everything, 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Millon, New Directions, supra note 1, at 1374 (discussing shareholder 
primacy); Johnson, supra note 1, at 1714 (addressing shareholder constituencies); 
Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 2, at 223–27 (discussing director’s 
duties to shareholders); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the 
Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 878–88 (1990) 
(discussing focus on shareholder accountability). 
 4. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against 
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 677 (2010) (discussing the 
1980s fueling market oriented corporate governance). 
 5. See ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 81–82 (1963) 
[hereinafter BERLE, REPUBLIC] (discussing the role of competitive markets in the 
American economy). 
 6. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World 1968) (1932). 
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bequeathing a political economy in which corporate power had 
been rendered benign: 
The 1929 crash, the slow recovery of 1930, and the ensuing 
spiral descent into an abyss of unemployment, bank failures, 
and commercial paralysis was not corrected by market 
processes. The contemporary business captains, working 
desperately (as they did) to meet the situation, failed 
completely. Following established precepts of the American 
political process, the public . . . increasingly asked that the 
political state propose a program and act. Necessarily, this 
meant considerable reorganization of private business . . . . Out 
of the crisis was born the American economic republic as we 
know it today.7  
In Berle’s new republic, the state and the economy were 
interdependent, with the state taking ultimate responsibility for 
economic results and exercising the higher level of power.8 The old 
economic order, with its private property and profit maximization 
engine, persisted9 and, incentivized by the profit motive, did the 
producing.10 The state had intervened only to stabilize its 
organizational lines and performance.11 More extensive 
government intervention had been avoided, but only because 
sophisticated private actors had learned to moderate their 
conduct.12 They had seen that the state’s regulatory power took 
precedence over their own economic power, and accordingly had 
restrained the exercise of their power for the sake of its own 
preservation.13 This permitted the state to exercise its economic 
power only negatively, rarely resorting to direct insistence on 
positive action.14 
                                                                                                     
 7. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 91. 
 8. See id. at 95, 99, 169 (addressing the formation of new government 
institutions to provide “economic ‘guide lines’”). 
 9. See id. at 99 (“It[, the modified order,] maintained the institution of 
private property and wealth.”). 
 10. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW 
DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 94 (1959) [hereinafter BERLE, 
POWER] (recognizing that government regulation of corporations assumes profit 
will incentivize production, supply, and distribution). 
 11. See BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 99 (suggesting a new system 
emerged from the “emergency base wrought in 1933”). 
 12. See id. at 169 (noting the lack of instruments like courts and tribunals). 
 13. See id. (“Economic power is secondary to political power.”). 
 14. See BERLE, POWER, supra note 10, at 94 (“Most, though by no means all, 
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Two factors were responsible for this healthy equilibrium: 
first, government management of the economy from an 
unchallenged position of higher authority and, second, a solid 
supporting political consensus.15 The public consensus in turn 
depended on corporate performance—price stability, jobs, and 
benefits.16 The voters had learned during the Depression that they 
did not want a perpetual struggle in a free market context.17 
Instead they wanted economic growth, distribution of its benefits 
to substantially all, and full employment.18 They also wanted 
predictability without halts and starts, both as to employment and 
the prices of goods and services.19 The interest groups—big 
business, small business, labor, and farmers—all were in accord, 
along with the majority of both political parties.20 Nothing in the 
post war era had changed those preferences.21 Nor was a future 
change foreseeable.22 
Berle described a benign equipoise amongst strong 
organizations, an equipoise constrained by a wider public 
consensus that empowered the central government in the role of 
welfare maximizer—he saw a state that guided and pushed 
markets to the right result with the cooperative engagement of 
interested parties.23 Managers were caught inside a web of 
countervailing powers and had no way to get out of control. The 
strands in the web were product market price competition, labor 
                                                                                                     
governmental power is negatively exercised: it takes the form of prohibiting 
certain uses of economic power by non-Statist organizations.”). 
 15. See id. at 120–22 (discussing increased production demands and need for 
continuity). 
 16. See id. at 122 (discussing desire for stability in labor market). 
 17. See id. (addressing fear of economic downturns). 
 18. See id. (discussing desire for “full employment”). 
 19. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 50–
51 (1954) [hereinafter BERLE, 20TH CENTURY] (discussing price stabilization in 
commodity markets). 
 20. See id. at 50 (“Obstinately, however, big business and small business, 
farmers and laborers, corporations which like their profit margins and labor 
unions which like their jobs, controlling majorities in the Republican as well as 
the Democratic parties, decline to acknowledge the error of their ways.”). 
 21. See id. (discussing maintenance of price stabilization under President 
Eisenhower). 
 22. See BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 99 (“There appears no present 
likelihood that a new basis will be sought in the foreseeable future.”). 
 23. See id. at 88 (discussing the role of the democratic process in change). 
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unions, trade associations, public opinion, management’s own 
sense of responsibility, and most importantly, government 
regulation.24 
Managers emerged as quasi-public servants.25 Whether they 
liked it or not, they were caught between the regulatory state and 
the public consensus.26 Failure to satisfy the public meant new 
regulation; avoidance of new regulation meant satisfying the 
public.27 So public duties could not, as a practical matter, be 
avoided, and managers emerged playing a role as economic and 
social allocators, actively assuming public functions.28 
Changes on the ground backed Berle’s vision. During the 
1950s in the United States, while other countries were instituting 
national health systems and generous state pension schemes for 
senior citizens, the corporations took on the great part of the 
welfare burden.29 This was in part an accident of history—pensions 
and medical benefits found their way into a high-profile settlement 
between General Motors and its unions in 1948, a settlement that 
was copied across the industrial landscape and modified over time 
to labor’s advantage as industries went from settlement to 
settlement.30 
Those years were—not coincidentally—the golden age of 
American management. Commentators described a new economy 
that had evolved past Adam Smith’s atomistic free market strivers 
so that forward motion came from innovative technocrats in 
management suites.31 Shareholders dropped out of this governance 
picture. Berle explained why; all they did was passively collect 
                                                                                                     
 24. See BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 53–59 (discussing obstacles 
of manager control). 
 25. See BERLE, POWER, supra note 10, at 8 (“Since they are not owners but 
only managers, they really are a variety of non-Statist civil servant.”). 
 26. See BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 59, 172–73 (discussing 
demands from public and government) 
 27. See id. at 59, 172–73 (discussing limited choices of managers). 
 28. See id. at 59, 175 (examining the rationale for corporate donations to 
educational institutions). 
 29. GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING 
THE HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY 42 (2016). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Edward S. Mason, The Apologetics of “Managerialism,” 31 J. BUS. 1, 
3, 10 (1958) (addressing the role of managers in the rise of large corporations). 
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dividends and then consume or save.32 As such, shareholders 
played no productive role in the economy. Stock market controls, 
seen today as the cutting edge of discipline and productive 
efficiency, were then thought to be largely irrelevant. Corporations 
in need of capital retained earnings or borrowed.33 The function of 
the stock market was to hold out liquidity for the benefit of the rich 
grandchildren of the entrepreneurs who had founded the great 
companies. Monitoring had gravitated over to the hands of 
government authorities,34 which mediated between producing 
companies and the markets. The shareholder franchise was 
likewise irrelevant, the annual vote for the board of directors 
having degenerated into a meaningless ritual.35 
As rich consumers, shareholders did play a role in social 
welfare enhancement as providers. They supported their families, 
they supported social welfare programs as taxpayers, and they 
supported charities as donors.36 As such, they were entitled to 
society’s thanks, but not its political solicitude. The shareholder 
interest would emerge as a legitimate force in society, said Berle, 
only when shareholder wealth was so widely distributed as to 
benefit every American family.37 Only in such a distributive utopia 
could the shareholder interest serve as a proxy for social welfare 
and thus hold out political economic salience. 
Interestingly, there was not much in the way of discussion of 
corporate social responsibility in post-war Berle. Regulation and 
                                                                                                     
 32. See BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 31–32 (arguing that no 
enterprise with so many members work absent a centralized command). 
 33. See id. at 36–37 (noting that during the preceding six years 64% of 
invested capital had been financed by retained earnings and only 6% from new 
equity); see also BERLE, POWER, supra note 10, at 45 (noting that 10–15% percent 
of new capital came from pension funds and insurance companies and 20% from 
bank borrowing). 
 34. See Adolf Berle, Property, Production and Revolution: A Preface to the 
Revised Edition of ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xxvii, xxxiii (Harcourt, Brace & World 1968) 
(1932) [hereinafter BERLE, 1967 INTRODUCTION] (discussing the rise of government 
intervention). 
 35. See BERLE, POWER, supra note 10, at 104–05 (identifying Board of 
Directors elections as “not an impressive ritual”). 
 36. See BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 51–52 (discussing welfare by the 
state and community). 
 37. See BERLE, 1967 INTRODUCTION, supra note 34, at xxxv (balancing 
shareholder interests and wealth inequality). 
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ancillary government pressure took care of externalities (or so he 
thought). The economy was growing, the constituents were 
content, and managers were seen as under control.38 Nor did Berle 
problematize compliance with law, for his managers proceeded 
decorously when dealing with the powerful post-New Deal state. 
III. Conflict and Resolution, 1970–1990 
Conflicts did simmer under the surface. They became manifest 
during the 1970s and played themselves out during the 1980s, 
posing a multi-sided and ultimately successful challenge to Berle’s 
American economic republic. This was the era during which 
corporate social responsibility and constituent rights came to the 
forefront of corporate policy debates, social responsibility in the 
1970s and constituencies in the 1980s, negating Berle’s vision of a 
satisfied public. Simultaneously, shareholder value maximization 
rose to prominence to pose a countervailing vision of the 
corporation’s place in society, a vision that focused on the market 
as opposed to government controls, and negated Berle’s vision of a 
benevolent state maximizer. A resolution followed: the shareholder 
vision won. Social responsibility would not be imposed on 
companies and constituents would get no rights, and, indeed, 
would see their positions deteriorate considerably even as the 
shareholder interest gained influence. 
The economic background was unstable during the early part 
of this period—the economic bill for the Vietnam War came due in 
1972 and 1973, when the stock market collapsed and the economy 
went into a severe recession aggravated by the mid-east oil crisis.39 
The stock market did not really recover until August of 1982—a 
whole decade in which there was no money to be made long in 
stocks even as inflation rose steeply. The malaise was called 
“stagflation” and undermined the economic assumptions of the 
managerial golden age.40 The appearance of international 
competition in manufactured goods added to the stock of chronic 
                                                                                                     
 38. See BERLE, POWER, supra note 10, at 120–22 (discussing production 
demands and content constituencies). 
 39. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 47. 
 40. Id. at 55. 
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problems.41 We were no longer a closed continental economy in 
which domestic corporations competed only against one another. 
People started to ask questions about how well managers were 
doing their jobs,42 questions that began with the sudden collapse 
of the once great Penn Central Railroad in 197043 and intensified 
as bad results accumulated. 
At the same time, the old New Deal political coalition that 
created and maintained the strong regulatory state fell apart. 
Managers, formerly co-operative in the face of overwhelming state 
power, defected, and started to play a hostile game against 
regulatory initiatives. Simply, they were no longer afraid of 
non-compliance.44 Deregulation also started in the 1970s, and 
picked up speed after 1980. Deregulation, however, meant removal 
of an existing regime only in a handful of industries.45 For the most 
part, deregulation meant not repeal but inaction—we just left 
things the way they were, even as corporate risk taking and 
externalization pursued new paths. 
The conceptual framework surrounding corporations changed 
substantially as a result. Unbridled management power, 
problematized by Berle back in 1932, came back to the forefront as 
the problem in need of solution.46 Corporate governance was 
invented to take care of the job. The phrase “corporate governance” 
had its first published appearance only in 1972.47 The first fully 
developed text on the subject, Melvin Eisenberg’s book, The 
                                                                                                     
 41. Id. at 55–56. 
 42. Id. at 56. 
 43. See STAFF REPORT OF THE SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N TO THE SPECIAL S. 
COMM. OF INVESTIGATIONS, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL 
COMPANY (1972) (discussing the fall of the Penn Central Railroad). 
 44. See Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity, Reforming 
the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA 
L. REV. 343, 347–48 (1981) (describing corporate noncooperation, such as court 
challenges and minimum legal compliance). 
 45. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a 
Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 628–30 (2007) (noting the regulation 
of specific “individual industries” had already replaced the breadth of New Deal 
regulations). 
 46. See id. at 630 (discussing the impact of deregulation on manager power). 
 47. See Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession 13 (John 
M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stanford, Working Paper No. 470, 2015), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2491088 (“[T]he New York Times featured the phrase 
as early as 1972 . . . .”). 
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Structure of the Corporation,48 followed quickly in 1976. Eisenberg 
synthesized and materially advanced a generation of thinking 
about deficiencies of the received legal model of the corporation.49 
For a corrective mechanism, he turned to the moribund board of 
directors.50 If we scaled down the demands we placed on a board of 
directors and successfully required it to monitor management 
performance (as opposed to taking a leadership role in hands on 
management), corporate performance would improve.51 This 
monitoring function in turn required independent directors and a 
committee structure keyed to monitoring functions.52 All of a 
sudden there was something that could be done about corporations 
and “corporate governance” held the key, with best practices as the 
focus of the new mode of discussion. Expectations ran high, higher 
than a bland list of best practices would seem to justify. “Corporate 
governance” held out something for everybody. 
The political left, which did not disappear quietly, grabbed 
hold of it first. Progressives, who in the 1970s still considered 
themselves the country’s natural ruling group, had become 
manifestly frustrated—they were dissatisfied with the level of new 
regulation and outraged by corporate non-co-operation even as 
they despaired of marshalling political backing for new 
initiatives.53 The American corporate social responsibility 
movement arose as a result, and its policy entrepreneurs looked to 
governance institutions for reform platforms.54 Director 
“independence,” they thought, could import corporate social 
responsibility.55 Maybe we could require corporations to nominate 
                                                                                                     
 48. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS (1976). Eisenberg’s monitoring model of the board of directors has ever 
since been the main focus of legal corporate governance. 
 49. See generally id. (discussing additional rules and structure for corporate 
governance). 
 50. See id. at 139–85 (discussing additional structure for board of directors 
and management). 
 51. See id. at 156–57 (discussing the function of the board of directors). 
 52. See id. (emphasizing the monitoring function of the board). 
 53. See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or 
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 597 (1982) (describing dissatisfaction 
with the current corporate regulatory regime). 
 54. See id. (discussing calls for reform). 
 55. See id. at 603–04 (noting a renewed focus on Berle’s concerns regarding 
outside directors).  
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their directors from a centrally qualified list, with all persons 
admitted to the list being sound progressive types.56 Maybe we 
could use the proxy system to tap into popular protest of 
irresponsible corporate policies.57 Maybe corporate law could be 
federalized and charter competition choked off, with the right sort 
of people cranking out new duties and reporting obligations.58 
None of this came to much. The political traction was not 
there, for, even as anti-corporate sentiment was gaining more 
political salience, the emerging political economic equilibrium was 
taking a regressive turn. A new outlet appeared to channel and 
partially appease this negative sentiment—not taxation, not 
redistribution, not a stable environment for working families, not 
progressive capture of corporate governance institutions, but 
compliance with law for its own sake. The watershed event was the 
foreign bribes scandal incident to the Watergate investigations, 
which resulted in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.59 
Much like New Deal initiatives, this intervention leaned on 
corporations to get them in line with the public program. But, as 
befits new regulation in a deregulatory era, it did not much 
implicate the economic substance of corporate management even 
as it constrained management power. Where in Berle’s day the 
regulatory objective was cooperative corporate participation in a 
national effort to enhance social welfare, now we had a narrower, 
simpler objective: to the extent we do have regulation, comply with 
it. Significantly, corporate governance mechanisms were pressed 
into the service of the new compliance goal, a practice that would 
proliferate in regulation generally as the command and control 
approach yielded to self-regulatory initiatives. 
                                                                                                     
 56. See Weiss, supra note 44, at 426–32 (discussing the composition of board 
of directors). 
 57. In 1970, a group of public interest lawyers launched a proxy contest at 
GM in an attempt to elect three progressives to the board of directors. “Campaign 
GM” received three percent of the votes. See Donald E. Schwartz, Proxy Power 
and Social Goals: How Campaign GM Succeeded, 45 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 764, 764–
66 (2012) (discussing the GM proxy campaign). 
 58. See NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 16 (1976) (discussing 
the great size and power of large corporations on a national level); Donald E. 
Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 548–49 
(1984) (discussing federal regulation of corporate governance). 
 59. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1-2, 78ff (2012) (demonstrating an 
increased effort to regulate corporate practices globally). 
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For a time, managers felt threatened. They turned to the same 
focal point as did everyone else—corporate governance—and tried 
to capture it for themselves. The Business Roundtable, seeking to 
stave off more intrusive initiatives, publicly embraced the 
independent director majority.60 So long as incumbent CEOs could 
use their influence to secure appointment of cooperative types, any 
threat was minimal.61 Cooperative engagement did not last long in 
any event. Once the political climate changed and the threat 
receded, management went back into opposition, fighting tooth 
and nail when the American Law Institute geared up to propose 
best practices mandates in the 1980s.62 
There would, however, be no letup in the governance-based 
assaults on management prerogatives. But the source of pressure 
changed when the shareholders themselves emerged in the 1980s 
to take their own place at the new corporate governance table and 
replace progressives as normative entrepreneurs. 
As we turn our attention to the shareholders, reference must 
be made to another fundamental text dating from the 1970s, the 
famous paper of Michael Jensen and William Meckling, Agency 
Costs and the Theory of the Firm, published in 1976.63 This coined 
another new term, “agency costs,” which would come into usage in 
tandem with “corporate governance,” with very different 
implications from those attached by 1970s progressives.64 Jensen 
and Meckling for the first time brought microeconomic analysis to 
the study of interior corporate arrangements, confirming the 
suggestion that corporate governance mattered for productivity.65 
                                                                                                     
 60. See Bus. Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors 
of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2085, 2089, 2093 
(1978) (proposing reforms to encourage more independent directors). 
 61. See Brudney, supra note 53, at 610–12 (describing the pattern of 
cooperation and management control of appointments). 
 62. See Victor Brudney, The Role of the Board of Directors: The ALI and Its 
Critics, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 223, 228 (1983) (opposing increased government 
regulation of board structure). 
 63. See generally Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976). 
 64. See id. at 308 (“We define agency costs as the sum of: (1) the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, (3) the 
residual loss.”). 
 65. See id. at 309 (“We show below that an explanation of why and how the 
agency costs generated by the corporate form are born leads to a theory of the 
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But there is a critical point of distinction between Jensen and 
Meckling’s vision and the vision of reformers like Eisenberg. 
Jensen and Meckling are the theoretical starting point for the 
assertions that the purpose of the corporation is shareholder value 
maximization and that market forces by themselves can discipline 
managers effectively—a different and radical reversal of the 
assumptions that underlay the Berle’s American economic 
republic.66 There was also a corollary proposition: if anything 
impeded the forces of market control, it followed that agency costs 
were excessive.67 
The market control scenario unfolded for real during the 
takeover wars of the 1980s.68 The markets, suppressed in the 
course of the New Deal settlement, came back to retake the 
forward role in corporate governance, a position that has been 
steadily solidifying ever since.69 Market control and shareholder 
value maximization operate in tandem. Indeed, they are two sides 
of the same coin.70  
                                                                                                     
ownership (or capital) structure of the firm.”). 
 66. See id. at 313 (“Prospective minority shareholders will realize that the 
owner-manager’s interests will diverge somewhat from theirs, hence the price 
which they will pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of 
the divergence between the manager’s interest and theirs.”). 
 67. See id. at 352 (“If the costs of reducing the dispersion of ownership are 
lower than the benefits to be obtained from reducing the agency costs, it will pay 
some individual or group of individuals to buy shares in the market to reduce the 
dispersion of ownership.”). 
 68. See Scheherazade S. Rehman, Can Financial Institutional Investors 
Legally Safeguard American Stockholders?, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 683, 701 (2006) 
(“In the 1980s, takeovers (friendly and hostile) radically changed the landscape 
of the U.S. economy.”). 
 69. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 676 (“[M]anagers emerged from 
the 1980s sensitized to the benefits of shareholder-value maximization even as 
the board of directors emerged as a more robust monitoring institution. Hostile 
takeovers lost their place at the cutting edge of corporate governance as a 
result.”). 
 70. See id. at 667 
[S]hareholder proponents contemplate a species of market control. 
They want the market price—which is, after all, set by shareholders 
investing at the margin—to be the ongoing and determining source of 
shareholder input. It bids those managers who are effective agents to 
manage to the stock market in formulating business policy, thereby 
accessing the high-quality instructions embedded in stock market 
prices. With the market price as the management yardstick, 
value-enhancing opportunities to merge, sell, or dissolve will no longer 
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Numerous factors combined to effect the change. Reagan came 
in and the left was marginalized.71 Antitrust policies that inhibited 
same industry mergers were abandoned.72 Labor unions markedly 
declined in influence.73 Competition from abroad intensified. As 
the junk bond became available, ideas about acceptable levels of 
leverage changed markedly so that high leverage became a means 
to facilitate corporate control transfers.74 The prime targets were 
the most extreme product of post-war managerialism, 
conglomerate structures, which had come to be seen as 
dysfunctional, for the stock market systematically undervalued 
their businesses.75 
The struggle’s end point is familiar enough. Leveraged 
restructuring roared through the economy before the takeovers 
finally stopped. The stoppage was the ostensible result of 
collaboration between managers and state lawmakers to deter 
takeovers with legal barriers.76 But economic factors also figured 
in—one recalls a severe recession and tight money, along with 
changes in asset prices. Whatever the reason for the stoppage, the 
hostile takeover would never again matter all that much. 
Meanwhile, thinking about corporations once again shifted 
fundamentally. Maximization of shareholder value came in as the 
objective to be achieved.77 Managers, once seen as effective 
                                                                                                     
be frustrated by the managers’ desire to hold on to control; resources 
will no longer be misdirected to suboptimal executive compensation 
plans; and governance arrangements will import appropriate 
constraints and incentives. Managing to the market price also is 
thought to import administrative coherence, because the yardstick 
provides a means with which to evaluate management performance. 
 71. See Terry Carter, Should This Toy be Saved?, 99 A.B.A. J. 48, 52 (2013) 
(“Then Ronald Reagan became president in 1981 with a mission to shrink 
government and lighten the regulatory load on business.”). 
 72. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 53–54. 
 73. Id. at 65–66. 
 74. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 870–71 (2013) (“By the mid-to late 1980s, more than half of 
all junk bond issuances were related to acquisitions.”). 
 75. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 54–59. 
 76. See Edward F. Greene, Regulatory and Legislative Responses to Takeover 
Activity in the 1980s: The United States and Europe, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 1542 
(1991) (“The desire by both management and state legislators to curb hostile 
takeovers placed the courts in a difficult dilemma.”). 
 77. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
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technocrats, now become incentive incompatible actors whose 
greed and incompetence choked the economy with chronic, 
out-of-control agency costs. Management empowerment 
accordingly remained as the salient policy problem, not because it 
resulted in externalities but because it left shareholders with 
suboptimal yields.78 Indeed, shareholders emerged as a permanent 
aggrieved class with an unmet regulatory entitlement.79 The long-
standing but vague association between corporate purpose and 
social welfare dropped out of the picture. 
IV. The Post-Takeover Era 
There was a lot of carnage in the transition from the social 
corporation of the American economic republic to today’s 
shareholder corporation. In the leveraged restructurings of the 
1980s, a couple of generations of corporate employees, who had 
justifiably expected that their companies held out careers, lost 
their jobs.80 Billions of dollars of wealth shifted as their human 
capital investments were sacrificed in order to enhance 
shareholder value. As a result, constituent concerns displaced 
more general concerns about social responsibility at the forefront 
of progressive critique of the operation of corporate law, with 
Lyman Johnson and David Millon at the discussion’s forefront.81 
There was even a law reform movement—a succession of bills was 
                                                                                                     
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 449 (2001) (“[I]f the control rights granted to the 
firm’s equity-holders are exclusive and strong, they will have powerful incentives 
to maximize the value of the firm.”). 
 78. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 659 (“If managers 
misunderstood the quantum of risks they were taking, then shareholders with 
more limited access to the relevant information certainly were no better informed 
and accordingly had no role to play in preventing externalization.”). 
 79. See id. at 665–73 (“Shareholder empowerment emerged from the 
takeover era as the leading issue in corporate law, with a consistent consensus in 
its favor.”). 
 80. See Patrick J. Ryan, Corporate Directors and the “Social Costs” of 
Takeovers—Reflections on the Tin Parachute, 64 TUL. L. REV. 3, 5 (1989) (“During 
1984 and the first half of 1985, an estimated 550,000 employees’ jobs were affected 
by takeover-related restructuring decisions.”). 
 81. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining that Johnson and 
Millon advocated for inclusion of constituent interests as beneficiaries in the 
corporation’s legal model). 
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introduced in Washington to ameliorate the dislocation 
experienced by the subject employees.82 None were enacted and the 
initiative faded away during the 1990s.83 Henceforth, the corporate 
law case for the employees’ interests would be tied to the case for 
management empowerment vis-à-vis shareholders, and 
subordinated thereto.84 
The job losses did not stop with the restructurings of the 
1980s. America’s large corporations have been steadily lightening 
their payrolls ever since. Manufacturing is outsourced wherever 
possible, usually abroad.85 The change is pervasive. The greatest 
corporate successes of the present age are in the computer and 
electronics and telecommunications industries. Even so, 
employment in these sectors has dropped dramatically since 
2000.86 Today’s most successful companies are Apple, which 
employs 92,000 (half of them in the stores), and Google, which 
                                                                                                     
 82. See Alan E. Garfield, Helping the Casualties of Creative Destruction: 
Corporate Takeovers and the Politics of Worker Dislocation, 16 J. CORP. L. 249, 
273 (1991) (“By comparison to the frenetic lawmaking by the states, the federal 
response to takeover dislocation has been all talk and no action. Numerous 
congressional committees have held hearings on the issue, but no significant 
legislation has been enacted to address the problem.”). 
 83. Below is a tabulation of bills introduced in Congress relating to 
corporations from 1987 to 2004, the “plant closing” category shows no activity 
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 84. This is the contribution of Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
 85. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 69–79. 
 86. Id. at 15. 
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employs 54,000.87 Facebook, which makes sense as number three, 
employs 12,500.88 The employment numbers fall off drastically at 
other successful tech companies.89 General Motors, the most 
successful of mid-twentieth century corporations, employed 
850,000 at its peak in the 1980s.90 
Simply, big corporations have lost their position as the focal 
point of the lives of most Americans. In the management golden 
age, corporations were the places where talented people made 
careers. Restructuring put an end to that. Now, instead of careers, 
we have jobs. And it is looking like jobs are disappearing as well—
there is shift away from jobs and employers to tasks and piecework 
contracts.91 In the golden age, big corporations handled the 
accumulation of retirement savings. They stopped doing that too, 
as employers shifted from defined benefit pension plans to defined 
contribution plans.92 In the golden age, big corporations took care 
of medical benefits for most Americans. But that burden 
eventually ripened into a competitive disadvantage as regards 
companies in countries that chose to put government welfare 
schemes in place instead.93  
None of this registers in today’s corporate law policy 
discussions. Downsizing and asset-lite business plans enhance 
return on equity for the shareholders’ benefit—end of discussion. 
The trade-offs of the 1980s have been forgotten without there ever 
having been a discussion of the cost-benefit question they posed: 
whether the toll of human capital taken together with the ancillary 
costs of over-leverage and resulting bankruptcy might have 
outweighed the shareholder benefits. The best account of the era 
                                                                                                     
 87. Id. at 147. 
 88. See Number of Facebook Employees from 2004 to 2016 (Full Time), 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/273563/number-of-facebook-
employees/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) (noting that as of December 2015 Facebook 
had 12,691 people under full-time employment). 
 89. See DAVIS, supra note 29, at xv (“At this writing, the combined global 
workforces of Facebook, Yelp, Zynga, LinkedIn, Zillow, Tableau, Zulily, and Box 
are smaller than the number of people who lost their jobs when Circuit City was 
liquidated in 2009.”). 
 90. See id. at 15 (providing a chart showing the number of people employed 
at General Motors from 1923 to 2009). 
 91. Id. at 144–49. 
 92. Id. at 120–21. 
 93. Id. at 119–21. 
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characterizes the overleverage as a cost-beneficial external shock 
that redirected the management’s incentives in the right, 
shareholder-oriented direction.94 The human capital sacrifice 
matters not at all—it is a mere incident of capitalism at its most 
dynamic.  
American society has been adjusting ever since to increased 
instability, decreased opportunity, and widening inequality. Such 
is the prestige of markets that few perceive this to be a problem. 
Meanwhile, management, which tried and failed to capture the 
newly important corporate governance system, has itself been 
captured in turn. During the golden age, managers took it out as 
salary under what today would look like egalitarian pay 
structures.95 Now managers take it out in equity compensation 
arrangements that tie their fortunes to the stock price.96 For all 
their complaining, they got with the program, and did well.  
Shareholder advocates have two modes of coping with this 
dark side.97 First, they assume that shareholder wealth 
maximization and social welfare maximization are more or less the 
same thing.98 Second, even if shareholder wealth maximization 
does not by itself enhance social welfare as a theoretical matter, it 
does so as a practical matter because most Americans now hold 
shares.99 Let us take up these claims in turn.  
                                                                                                     
 94. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and 
Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001, at 122–23 (“Thanks to lucrative stock option plans, 
managers could share in the market returns from restructured companies. 
Shareholder value became an ally rather than an enemy.”). 
 95. DAVIS, supra note 29, at 131–34. 
 96. See Matthew A. Mellone, The Section 83(b) Election and the Fallacy of 
“Earned Income”, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 53, 54 (2013) (“The putative benefits of 
equity compensation arrangements are imbedded in the stock price at the time of 
grant.”). 
 97. See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders 
and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489 (2013) (describing both modes of 
the theory that shareholder maximization and social welfare maximization are 
linked). 
 98. See generally id. (“Under this theory, shareholder wealth maximization, 
it seems, is a key that unlocks the door to making the world a better place.”). 
 99. See id. at 489–90 (“[T]he quest for political solicitude has made the jump 
from theory to practice: a ‘shareholder class’ is said to have risen in our political 
economy as an offshoot of the growth of stock ownership among the middle class. 
Thus, real-world shareholders again are seen to bear on social welfare.”). 
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The first claim posits that shareholder value maximization 
and social welfare maximization are synonymous, or, at least that 
shareholder value is a robust proxy for social welfare.100 This is 
inexcusably bad economics.101 To see why, one needs to go back to 
theoretical square one, the first fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics.102 This begins with a general equilibrium view of the 
economy and assumes away externalities103 to pose that a 
competitive economy maximizes wealth.104 The normative kicker is 
that everything that can be done to make the economy more 
competitive should be done so that the economy reaches a Pareto 
optimal production possibility frontier, the point of economic 
efficiency.105 Once we reach the frontier, we encounter the second 
fundamental theorem, which introduces social welfare. This 
theorem holds that, given an efficient economy, preferences for 
redistribution can be dealt with through lump sum taxes and 
transfers, provided that the transfers do nothing to impair the 
incentives that got us to the efficient frontier in the first place.106 
Things get tricky at this point because it is very likely that taxes 
and transfers will impair productive incentives, which in turn 
implies a policy against redistribution. Happily, the theory of the 
                                                                                                     
 100. See id. at 498 (“[A] related question can be asked: whether shareholder 
value maximization legitimately can be characterized as a ‘proxy’ for social 
welfare maximization.”). 
 101. See id. at 497 (“From the point of view of economic theory, ‘social welfare’ 
does not necessarily enter into this discussion, which concerns only the creation 
of wealth.”). 
 102. See id. at 498 (“The exercise directly extends the first fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics. Strictly speaking, it provides a basis for describing 
shareholder value maximization as wealth maximization, but not as social 
welfare maximization.”). 
 103. All individuals and firms are price takers, each firm produces so as to 
maximize its profits subject to a production constraint, and each individual 
consumes so as to maximize individual utility. See generally Allan M. Feldman, 
Welfare Economics, in 8 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 722 
(Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 104. Id. at 723. 
 105. See William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. 
CORP. L. 713, 715 (2014) (describing the first and second fundamental theorems 
of welfare economics). 
 106. More particularly, given the outcome of the first theorem, almost any 
Pareto optimal equilibrium can be achieved given imposition of appropriate taxes 
and transfers. See Feldman, supra note 103, at 724 (examining the necessary 
wealth-redistributive effects for optimal social welfare). 
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second best comes to the rescue, posing that taxes and transfers 
can make us better off net of their costs by satisfying preferences 
for social welfare-enhancing outcomes, even though production lies 
short of the efficient frontier.107 
Let us extend the first theorem to corporate production. The 
adaption is quite easy: a system of corporate governance is ex ante 
efficient if it generates the highest possible payoff for all the 
parties involved, shareholders, creditors, employees, clients, tax 
authorities, and other third parties that may be affected by the 
corporation's actions.108 As a matter of economic theory, the 
extension is completely uncontroversial, even though it sweeps in 
constituent interests. To get to shareholder wealth maximization 
as the purpose of the corporation, one must take two further, 
assumption-laden steps. 
The first step comes from the ur-text, Jensen and Meckling, 
and requires us to unpack some assumptions. Jensen and Meckling 
posited that if the firm is modeled as a nexus of complete contracts 
among all parties involved except for the contract between a firm 
and its shareholders, which is modeled as incomplete, then 
maximization of shareholder value is tantamount to the 
economically efficient result.109 This assertion is literally true—if 
everybody other than one incomplete contract holder has a 
complete maximizing contract, then everybody other than the one 
incomplete contract claimant is already maxed out, and 
                                                                                                     
 107. See Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second 
Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) (“The general theorem for the second best 
optimum states that if there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a 
constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the 
other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer 
desirable.”). 
 108. See Marco Becht et al., Corporate Governance and Control 8 (ECGI 
Finance, Working paper No. 02/2002, 2002), http://ssrn.com/abs=343461 (“[A] 
corporate charter is ex-ante efficient if it generates the highest possible joint 
payoff for all the parties involved, shareholders, creditors, employees, clients, tax 
authorities, and other third parties that may be affected by the corporation’s 
actions.”).  
 109. See id. at 8–9 (“[O]nly shareholders have a claim on residual returns 
after all other contractual obligations have been met . . . .”). Agency costs are 
assumed away. See id. at 9 (“Under this scenario, corporate governance rules 
should be designed to protect and promote the interests of shareholders 
exclusively.”). 
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maximizing for the remaining claimant is economically efficient by 
definition. 
It is worth noting that economic theory here opens a door for 
proponents of constituency interests to advance efficiency claims. 
All they have to do is point out that other constituents have 
incomplete contracts too, an assertion that is manifestly correct. 
This creates a problem for shareholder proponents, for they have 
to show that other constituent incompleteness does not disable 
their case. This theoretical burden is addressed with a trio of 
assertions: first, relatively speaking shareholders are more 
vulnerable than are other stakeholders;110 second, decision-making 
costs should be minimized and a multi-constituent model imports 
incoherence, adding to decision-making costs;111 and third, the 
shareholder interest is the residual interest and thus provides a 
superior management reference point.112 
If one accepts these arguments (an admittedly big “if”), then 
shareholder maximization is confirmed as the firm’s theoretical 
objective function. But the framework of analysis is limited. All we 
are talking about is economic efficiency—that is, reaching the 
production possibility frontier. Social welfare is not implicated. 
Can one still say that managing to maximize shareholder 
value proxies for social welfare? A lot of people do just that.113 In 
fact, some avoid inserting the “proxy” qualification and casually 
assume identity between shareholder value maximization and 
social welfare maximization. But the proposition is theoretically 
perverse either way. One suspects that the proponents are 
jockeying into position for the follow up discussion about 
                                                                                                     
 110. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 
(1984) (“Some managements, however, play ‘end games’ (undisclosed strategic 
decisions to cut and run before corrective measures can be taken) and individual 
managers commonly disclose information selectively or distort data. Additional 
checks against such concealment and distortion can be devised to give 
shareholders greater confidence.”). 
 111. See Becht et al., supra note 108, at 9 (“In his view, determining which 
constituency should govern the firm comes down to identifying which has the 
lowest decision making costs and which has the greatest need of protection.”). 
 112. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 77, at 449 (“[I]n most 
circumstances, the interests of equity investors in the firm—the firm’s residual 
claimants—cannot adequately be protected by contract. Rather, to protect their 
interests, they must be given the right to control the firm.”). 
 113. No names will be mentioned. 
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shareholder value maximization’s political economic implications. 
A social welfare characterization imports political legitimacy to 
deregulatory claims and policies that enhance market controls. 
Indeed, to the extent that economic efficiency and social welfare 
maximization are deemed equivalent, redistributive discussion is 
pretermitted altogether. Such habits of mind are unsurprising in 
an age in which economic disparities are widening. 
The socio-economic status of shareholders has no relevance in 
this efficiency discussion. Things change once the topic shifts to 
social welfare, which is about distribution rather than production. 
Berle’s assertion that the shareholder interest can proxy for the 
public interest only when all Americans hold shares114 returns to 
challenge shareholder proponents. They respond with their second 
claim. 
The second claim posits that the shareholder population has 
been democratized as an incident of the proliferation of retirement 
savings. The focal point showing is a 2005 study from the 
Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry 
Association.115 The study showed that one-half of all U.S. 
households now directly or indirectly own equities, up from about 
one-fifth in 1983.116 They further reported that 90% of 
equity-owning households invest in stock mutual funds and nearly 
half own individual stock directly.117 They add that the 
householders are virtuous shareholders, buying and holding their 
stock for the long term.118 The householders “typically” own stock 
and funds worth $65,000, representing “more than half” of their 
total “financial assets.”119 Their median age is relatively young, 
                                                                                                     
 114. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (considering a hypothetical 
distributive utopia). 
 115. INVESTMENT CO. INST. & SECURITY INDUS. ASS’N., EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN 
AMERICA, 2005 (2005). The report summarizes results of a survey conducted by 
the Boston Research Group in January 2005. See id. at 39 (“The survey collected 
detailed information on individual stock and stock mutual fund ownership inside 
and outside employer-sponsored retirement plans.”).  
 116. See id. at 1 (“The number of households owning equities has increased 
more than three-fold since the early 1980s.”). 
 117. See id. (demonstrating this assertion via graph labeled Figure 1). 
 118. See id. at 4 (“As in past years, nearly all equity owners in 2005 follow a 
buy-and-hold investment philosophy and view their equity holdings as long-term 
investments.”). 
 119. Id. More than 40% held stock or stock mutual funds through IRAs; and 
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fifty-one years, and only 56% of the group graduated from 
college.120 It is a pretty picture. 
The statistics have been selected with care, however. The 
Federal Reserve Board’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finances 
provides a more complete picture. The 2013 Survey shows that the 
top 10% of households by wealth class owned 81.4% of the stock, 
with the top one percent owning 37.8%.121 If we look at the 
shareholdings of the top 10% wealth class across time, there is 
some evidence of flattening.122 In 1983 the top 10% owned 89% of 
the stock, a proportion that dropped to 81% by 1989, the same 81% 
that obtained in 2013, and also, within a narrow band of 
fluctuation, in the intervening years.123 Extrapolating, movement 
to defined contribution plans did democratize shareholding, but 
only slightly and with an effect that completely worked itself 
through the economy before 1990.  
Summarizing, shareholder value does not proxy for social 
welfare and no progress in that direction has registered during the 
shareholder value era. 
V. The Present Posture 
The scope of corporate legal theory’s mainstream discussion 
has narrowed steadily since Berle’s day. He integrated the 
corporation in an overall political economy in which corporations 
played role in both production and allocation. Today, we only worry 
                                                                                                     
nearly 90% held some or all of their equities in tax-deferred accounts. Id. at 15. 
 120. Id. at 5. A subsequent study tracking equity and bond ownership 
appeared in 2008 from the same two organizations. This shows some deterioration 
in the numbers: equity-owning householders grew to 53% in the peak year of 2001 
but then declined to 45% in 2008. INVESTMENT CO. INST. & SEC’S INDUS. & FIN. 
MKT. ASSOC., EQUITY AND BONDS OWNERSHIP, 2008, 7 (2008). The explanation lay 
to some extent with participation in defined contribution pension plans. It seems 
that a period of employer-by-employer pension fund expansion ended after 2000. 
Once the saturation point was reached, a disinclination to participate on the part 
of younger employees began to effect overall ownership numbers. Reverses in the 
equity markets filled out the explanation. Id. at 11.  
 121. Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962–
2013: What Happened Over the Great Recession?, 56 tbl.7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 20733, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20733. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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about production. This is nobody’s fault. Corporate law follows 
from and reflects the national social settlement.  
Today’s corporate legal theory centers on a small-scale policy 
discussion about the balance of power between shareholders and 
managers. Most participants obsess on excess, embedded agency 
costs, and model shareholders as a permanently disadvantaged 
group with an outstanding, unmet regulatory entitlement. It is a 
picture that resonates less and less, for the central trend since 
1990 has been progressive agency cost reduction at the instance of 
market forces—just what Jensen and Meckling predicted.124 With 
the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that the shareholders 
decisively won their battle with management between 1985 and 
1990, and did so without a significant regulatory assist.  
This is where corporate law is going to stay, absent a negative 
external shock that upends the social settlement. We did have a 
negative shock in 2008, but not enough of one to jolt the social 
settlement. It was, in retrospect, just a blip on the screen. There is 
a standing concern about unproductive short-termism, triggered 
by the activities of activist hedge funds. But there is no compelling 
evidence from practice to back up the claim of a systematic crimp 
on productivity. Shareholder power certainly can have negative 
effects on going concerns, but they show up company by company 
rather than systemically, just as do agency costs.  
If anything, the scope of corporate legal theory will narrow 
even more. The days of a separation of ownership and control as 
an over-arching political economic problem that corporate law 
needs to solve are over. If shareholder empowerment is here to stay 
and will not turn out to have systematic perverse effects (more 
admittedly big “ifs”), shareholder-management relations will fall 
back from the policy margin to become a field in which decision-
making is customarily left to the business judgments of parties 
with direct stakes. Corporate law will become a field in which the 
basic assumption is that private ordering confronts the problems 
and effects any needed changes. The public coloration will fade so 
much that corporate law will look more and more like the rest of 
private law, a platform on which parties capable of self-protection 
                                                                                                     
 124. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 675–88 (“Our challenge follows 
from the lesson Jensen and Meckling taught in their classic work on agency costs: 
institutions change in response to market incentives.”). 
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bargain over outcomes. We made up our collective mind during the 
1980s to forget about the externalities the bargaining parties 
inflict along the way. But for a passing concern with externalities 
inflicted by financial companies in 2008 and the years thereafter, 
we maintained that posture ever since. 
Should a future shift in the national social settlement rouse us 
from this collective amnesia, the writings of Lyman Johnson and 
David Millon will be there to facilitate restoration. 
